The exploitation of coltan in Central Africa can be considered a case of conflict minerals due to its nature. Many international organizations and bodies, national governments and private sector organizations seek to address this conflict, in particular via transparency, certification and accountability along the material supply chain. This paper analyses the international trade dimension of coltan and gives evidence on the dimension of illicit trade of coltan. The authors start from the hypothesis that illicit trade of coltan sooner or later will enter the market and will be reflected in the statistics. The paper is structured in the following manner: first, a short section gives a profile of coltan production and markets; second, an overview of the mining situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and related actors. The third section addresses mechanisms, actors and measurement issues involved in the international trade of coltan. The final part draws lessons for certification and conflict analysis and offers some guidance for future research. The paper identifies two main possible gateways to trace illegal trade in coltan: the neighbouring countries, especially Rwanda, and the importing countries for downstream production, in particular China. Our estimation is that the value of such illicit trade comes close to $ 27 million annually (2009), roughly one fifth of the world market volume for tantalum production. With regard to any certification the paper concludes that this will become challenging for business and policy: (a) Central Africa currently is the largest supplier of coltan on the world market, many actors profit from the current situation and possess abilities to hide responsibility; (b) China will need to accept more responsibility, a first step would be the acceptance of the OECD guidelines on due diligence; (c) better regional governance in Central Africa comprises of resource taxation, a resource fund and fiscal coordination. An international task force may provide more robust data, however more research will also be needed.
Introduction
Coltan mining in Central Africa and especially in the Eastern Kivu region of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) has often been viewed as a case for a conflict over the control of raw materials in a fragile state . Although the DRC see to advance in some key areas lately, e.g. in macro-economic management, education enrolment or improving drinking water supply (UNEP, 2011) , it remains one of the poorest countries world-wide (UNDP, 2011) . Rebel groups and others go on fighting over access to minerals and profit from illicit trade, and the state still fails to provide sufficient social order resulting in unchecked criminal activities. The easy access to coltan and other minerals, combined with weak property rights in a country with weak basic institutions and a long history of civil war, and a high demand on world markets can be assumed as main determinants of insecurity and conflicts, especially in the eastern Congo (Nest 2011: 71ff.) .
There is a clear pledge for international action from various sides. The United Nations have established evidence and given recommendations by means of several Expert reports. The most recent one (S/2010/596) and the ensuing UN Security Council resolution (S/RES/1952) of late 2010 call on governments, markets and companies to establish sound systems of supply chain management as well as to impose asset freezes and travel bans for groups and individuals involved in the conflict. In a similar spirit, the G8 resolution of Heiligendamm has started a process to establish certified trading chains in minerals production (CTC); a first activity has been the development of a new geochemical method called 'Analytical Finger-printing' (AFP) since 2006 that will allow exact pinpointing of the extraction source of a mineral used in products. Initiatives have also been taken by the private sector aiming at transparency and improving the traceability along their supply chains. The annex of this paper contains a number of such initiatives. Needless to say, however, all these initiatives are voluntary, pledges and the few commitments are not yet implemented. The willingness to take serious action seems low compared with the pressing situation. However the DoddFrank Act in the USA proposes registration requirements for conflict minerals including coltan from that region. In Europe, the European Commission has quite recently introduced a similar proposal for a country-by-country reporting for large listed and unlisted companies in the extractive and logging sectors.
In order to learn more about the challenges towards transparency and certification, it is the intention of this paper to analyse the international trade dimension of this conflict. The authors acknowledge the work that has been done to analyse the regional conflict and to provide evidence for an involvement of different actors. Doing new analysis on the Kivu region how-ever is beyond the scope of this paper.
Based on latest findings and focussing on the international trade dimension, our paper raises the thesis that any certification scheme is faced with a number of challenges. In doing so we address the following issues: What is the dimension of illicit trade? What actors are involved in the international supply chain? What levels of governance need to be addressed? With evidence on the significant amount of illicit trade and the heterogeneity of actors we conclude on activities that would (a) strengthen the institutional robustness of certification and (2) accompanying governance mechanisms that deem necessary.
These issues will be addressed in the following manner: the next two sections will give brief and up-to-date overviews about coltan markets and the mining situation in the DRC. A subsequent section will deal more extensively with international trade of coltan. It addresses mechanisms, actors and measurement issues. The last part will draw lessons for certification scheme and better resource governance and offers some guidance for future research.
Going beyond coltan, a study by the World Economic Forum (2011: 23) refers to illicit trade of minerals in general as a major geopolitical risk with a market size of some US $ 20,000 million annually. Thus we believe that such research is of relevance and part of a larger agenda on resources policy, international economics and sustainable resource management.
Profiling coltan
Coltan is a term commonly used to refer to columbite-tantalite, a mineral extracted in Central Africa and belongs to a group that is internationally known as tantalum.
1 This element of the 5 th group of the 6 th period of the chemical periodical system occurs in the Earth crust with a share of roughly 2 ppm (parts per million), i.e. three times more often than silver. It has a strong geochemical coherence with niobium. The United States Geological Survey (USGS 2011), Roskill (2009) Some supply is also provided by synthetic concentrates produced from tin slag, which are by-products from tin smelting (7 % in 2008 (7 % in , Roskill 2009 . Secondary production and recycling do not play a major role yet. Within industry, 20 -25% of annual production inputs result from recycling activities done along production routes in attempts to reduce losses and minimize waste. Any approach to closing international material loops and to recycle tantalum from electronic goods and other products however barely exists. Sources: USGS (2011) and various other years of its tantalum report; data for 2010 preliminary.
Reasons are related to  technology issues -the shares within products are tiny, challenges of pulverization during dismantling processes are huge, hence a need to develop new recycling technologies has been expressed;
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 economic issues -establishing collection and dismantling systems requires an international approach implying high upfront transaction and investment costs while no regulation exists;
Thus, material leakage and dissipative losses are quite high.
Market demand for tantalum has been increasing over the last 10 -15 years. Some 60 % of tantalum is being used for capacitors in electronic goods and devices such as mobile phones, pagers, PCs etc. (Roskill (2009: 110ff) . The continued growth of the mobile phone sector in Africa, Asia, and other regions will continue to be a source of growth. In addition, tantalum carbide is used for high-tech cutters, in air and space technology, and for turbines. Future demand is expected to grow, with new applications in ICT, machinery, energy production turbines, energy storage, aircrafts and optical industry. Possible substitutes in those areas exist, such as niobium in carbides or rare earth elements for high temperature applications. But none of these possible substitutes performs as effectively as tantalum so far, they may pose other challenges, and rare earth elements are regarded as critical metals too. For these reasons, tantalum ranks in the upper right quadrant of the EU's Raw Material Initiative 6 where the most critical minerals are listed; its economic importance is very high, the supply risk must be taken serious, and the environmental dimension should not be overlooked.
Thus, coltan mining in the DRC cannot be isolated from international markets and can hardly be focused on one application only (e.g. mobile phones). Research can transfer lessons from other conflict minerals, such as diamonds. However, coltan is not an endproduct in itself and the production chain is complex. Thus, the specific characteristics of this material need to be considered in the design of any certification scheme (see below).
Coltan mining in the DRC
Due to specific geological conditions -deposits are too small to be amenable to largescale industrial mining -, Coltan mining in eastern DRC is mainly done as artisanal and small-scale mining (ASM, Garrett 2008) . ASM differs considerably by mineral and province in terms of how the sector is governed, how the economy and society are structured, and the form of the mining groups. The sector is dynamic in its proliferation, with new ASM sites springing up regularly, frequent power shifts and mineral-specific reconfigurations of actors and local informal governance regimes. Employment is mainly for low-skilled local people. Estimations vary on the number of artisanal miners between 500.000 and 2 million in DRC.
With an average of four to five dependents for each digger, the total number of persons whose livelihood depends on this activity could be as high as 8 to 10 million or up to 16 % of the total population of DRC (World Bank 2008 : Nest 2011 . As indicated by a study on the mining sector in DRC (World Bank 2008) , the polluting effects of this artisanal activity include possible decadence of unsafe mine tailings and waste dumps, water pollution caused by acid mine drainage, improper closure of pits and mines, dumping of toxic effluent into the water, mining waste, etc. Landscape alterations such as forest clearance and cutting of timber and firewood are serious and often irreversible, with secondary effects on local agriculture, fishery and forestry that is devastating if small scale farmers hire themselves out as diggers (Nest 2011: 49) .
In addition to the environmental consequences directly and indirectly caused by mining, the presence of armed groups and their control over several areas can aggravate the destruction of natural habitats. In fact, the armed groups don't limit themselves to profit from the extraction of minerals, but they finance themselves through the illegal exploitation of other natural resources too (minerals such as gold, cassiterite, tungsten and other natural resources such as timber trade, meat, illegal fishing and poaching, UN 2010). Focusing regulation on one issue thus gives incentives to shifting illegitimate activities rather than abandoning them.
There is robust evidence on how rebel groups are profiting from the minerals extraction and trade. Of the 13 major mines, 12 are said to be controlled by armed groups (Nathan / Sarkar 2010: 22) . The weakness of R 's institutions and the lack of an effective and sufficiently paid national army, are responsible for the proliferation of military groups, which replace this vacuum with alternative forms of governance. ASM is often controlled by small, locally-based armed groups or militias, collectively called the mai mai. The larger armed units and the mai mai both "tax" the mines directly and indirectly extort money or minerals at the check-points they control.
Especially two groups, the Congrès National pour la Défense du Peuple (CNDP), a political movement with a military wing called the Congolese National Army (CNA), and the Forces Démocratiques de Libération du Rwanda (FDLR) have been investigated by UN Expert Panels. CNDP presence is limited to few coltan mines. The Bibatama Coltan mine e.g. is owned by a national senator who seems to accept the presence of the CNDP and pays a price of $0.20/kg exported at checkpoints. FDLR, on the contrary, has been present in the two Kivus for at least 14 years. The group can count on a strong business network that enables the militia to receive the supplies needed, including weapons. The UN panel estimates that FDLR is reaping profits worth millions of dollars a year from trade of minerals in eastern DRC. For these relations they are described as "les grands commerçants" and they often involve ongolese civilians that are forced to act or trade on their behalf.
More in general, the typologies of involvement of these armed groups in the mineral trade can vary, including taxation, payment of protection fees, commercial involvement in the mining activity and pillage. 7 Worth noting, that these groups also profit from other minerals such as gold and cassiterite.
The recent UN report (S/2010/596) establishes evidence on the involvement of the Congolese national army. Congolese army units are competing among themselves for control over mineral-rich areas; they collude with armed groups in order to attack rival commanders, and they have gained control over large areas rich in natural resources in North and South Kivu provinces. In Walikale territory, the part of North Kivu richest in cassiterite (tin ore), control of the minerals trade was "awarded" to the N P to encourage it to integrate into the Congolese army, as agreed in an early-2009 peace deal. Though the formal army in the DRC is paid, the payment is just low, so the challenge is about the magnitude of payment and incentives for additional sources of income.
This situation of increasing involvement of armed groups in mineral trade and the difficulty of getting rid of it has been used as official justification by the Government of DRC for its temporary freeze in the mining activities of the provinces of South and North Kivu and Maniema on 11 September 2010 (UN 2010). The consequences of this action on production are still unknown. The UN claims that mining activity is still ongoing at night. It is sure that those who will be mostly affected are the people who depend on this activity for their living.
Main actors in coltan mining in the DRC are as follows (figure 2).It is thus not just a conflict over mining activities. Resource rents can be accrued throughout a number of subsequent transportation stages and intermediaries at local markets within the region. The number of actors involved (see graph) and the fact that official representatives and armed groups often cooperate make up for an intransparent situation. Even like-minded actors have difficulties to get evidence on whether any permission or certificate is legally correct and complies with basic laws. As a result, many actors benefit from the current situation, and there is hardly an incentive to change this from within: a self-perpetuating lock-in situation within a fragile state. 
Coltan and international trade: dimension and actors
Tantalum materials are not openly traded; there is no stock market or spot market where prices could be compared. Purchase contracts are confidential between buyer and seller. Current data evidence reveals that Central Africa has become the major supplier for coltan / tantalum on world markets in 2009/10 -and possibly even earlier.
However any estimation of the total amount of coltan produced in the DRC and traded internationally is limited by data availability, comparability and reliability as well as by difficulties of tracing illegal trade in Eastern Congo. Thus, tracing any illicit trade and estimating the real amount of coltan produced in and exported by DRC remains a central challenge.
The following part of our paper starts from the assumption that any illicit trade with coltan sooner or later enters the markets and is hence reflected in statistics downstream. Going beyond inconsistencies of DRC data, two possible gateways for such laundry mechanisms will be investigated:
Neighbouring countries: they may declare exports that are not entirely covered by adding up domestic production and imports (and possible stockpiles).
2. Importing countries: especially huge economies may declare imports that are not equal to exports of that respective country. 8 Potentially it might also be interesting to assess business reports since coltan / tanatalum is input to specialized capacitor production with few producers worldwide it might be possible to get evidence for inconsistencies. But the data availability in that area is too poor yet. In 2009, bilateral trade data (see fn 7) indicates that DRC exports mount up to a minimum of 275 t with a value of around 4 million US$ -comparable to the combined production of Brazil and Australia in that year.
As mentioned above, Rwanda is deemed to be the preferred trade route for illegally traded minerals financing the conflict parties for several reasons. Besides geographical reasons, exports of tantalum concentrates aren't taxed in Rwanda while R has been taxing official mineral exports. Thus, trade via Rwanda is more profitable than legal exports via Kinshasa (Garrett/ Johnson 2008) . According to Rwandan law, imported minerals could be declared as minerals produced in Rwanda if they are further processed in Rwanda and enhanced in value of about 30%. Thus, coltan imported from DRC to Rwanda could be legally exported as coltan from Rwanda without separating whether it was imported legally or illegally. Global Witness (2010: 13) figure 4) . Obvious are high net-exports compared to very moderate production figures. Chinese imports from Rwanda* Imports of tantalum minerals from Rwanda (Roskill, gross mass) [ There is no doubt that a regional shift of trade pattern can be observed: during the nineties, western countries had been the dominant importers of coltan from DRC. China is also by far the most important importer of tantalum produced in the Central African region. Since 2000, China's imports of tantalum and niobium ores from this region rose from 435 t or 11.3 million US$ to 3.154 t with a value of 36.3 million US$ in 2009. Direct imports from DRC are minor compared to other suppliers, among which the most relevant is Rwanda (see figure 5) . In physical terms, China imported around 73 % of all exported tantalum and niobium ores of the region (assuming that vanadium is rather negligible). Roskill (2009: 148) reports that the average price of hina's imports from Rwanda has been 2 -2.7 times lower than the import price of Australian tantalite. In the first half of 2009 it was 3.7 times lower. Not neglecting different qualities (see fn 7, these enormous differences can be assumed as key reasons for the strong position of Rwandaas a trade hub, the shifting of capacitor manufacturing to China, and the currently miserable situation of the conventional supply chain of tantalum. And, indeed, it fuels illegal and criminal activities of all kinds.
Following the estimation of around 900 tonnes illicit trade in the most recent year and assuming similar price ranges for coltan from DRC and Rwanda results in a loss of potential income in the order of between $ 12 and 28 million for DRC in that year.
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This is a significant amount in a country, which ranges at the bottom of development rankings (HDI position 187 out of 187, UNDP 2011). On top of that one would also have to add loss of revenues from other illegal mineral exports.
The typical supply chain of coltan produced in DRC and sold by illegitimate means thus looks as follows: it is exported via Rwanda or other Central African Countries, and is bought by Chinese processors. These processors are often smaller companies who do not have pressure to disclose information or to report. They, in turn, produce and export downstream products such as K-salt used to make capacitor-grade powder. Those products do enter the global market while their origins are obscured. The case of CNMC Ningxia Orient Nonferrous Metal Group seems illustrative for these concerns. The state-owned enterprise is one of the world's top three smelters and producers of tantalum. The tantalum it produces is used by the largest capacitor manufacturers such as the US based AVX, that in turn supply electronics to companies such as ell, Intel and RIM (' lackberry') and Hewlett-Packard. Although the company claims to have transparent sourcing practices, Global Witness (2010) has raised concerns that the K-salt20 that the company uses to produce tantalum and that it claims to come from refineries in China, can be used to cover the Congolese origin of the tantalum they use. Nathan / Sarkar (2010: 23) claim that Ningxia continues to import coltan from DRC despite all concerns. Ningxia has not responded to a questionnaire that was done by Resolve (2010: 39) in a attempt to address supply chain challenges for electronics industry and their use of critical metals.21 It is also 20 K-salt is tantalum ore that has been chemically refined to make the compound called potassium tantalum fluoride 21 According to Resolve (2010: 39) , all major producers of electronic goods responded on tantalum (Apple, Dell, HP, IBM, and others), roughly half of the component manufacturers, only one of the processors (Cabot), and none of the actors involved in earlier stages (except Talison, the Australian interesting to see that capacitor production in China and exports thereof have been increasing rapidly over the previous few years, meaning that any supply chain management with certification rests more and more upon the credibility of China.
Lessons for any certification scheme and better resource governance
Our analysis reveals inconsistencies in tantalum data and indicates a remarkable scope for hiding illicit trade. Both the neighboring countries and the Chinese gateway show a dimension according to which the total amount of coltan traded may outweigh the official DRC production, possibly by a factor of three. Despite all uncertainties regarding data, however, analysis can draw useful lessons for any certification scheme. The following three governance challenges become obvious.
Firstly, Central Africa including the DRC and Mozambique is now the largest supplier of coltan / tantalum on world markets. Our short analysis of the DRC reaffirms that major actors in the region cooperate in their efforts to profit from mining and trading coltan. The conflict structure is dominated by rent-seeking activities of a number of actors over all stages of the supply chain until it enters official markets, not just by fighting over mining licences. The involvement of DRC officials, the ability to earn incomes higher than average as well as the desperate situation of the local population, triggered by high world market demand and no transparency requirements, favor a rather perverse stability of such situation. Any certification scheme thus should take into account the ability of all actors involved to mix legal mining products with others along the first stages of the supply chain.
Secondly, coltan (tantalum) has interesting characteristics for a number of technology applications. Focusing on one application (e.g. mobile phones) may raise awareness but bears the risks of shifting production patterns to other technology areas where public attention is comparatively low. In addition, focusing on a limited number of conflict minerals gives incentives for shifting illegitimate activities to other profitable minerals. The scope thus should cover all applications and all commodities from conflict regions.
Thirdly, the involvement of China, other Asian countries and production located there lead to international governance challenges while transparency is poor. The large number of small producers for a number of tantalum products such as K-salt and tantalum powder makes it fairly difficult to establish a reliable certification scheme. Moreover, the international dimension adds un-intended negative effects to certification schemes: if like-minded producers manage to establish a sustainable supply chain management for a number of commodities (however difficult this may be!), their competitors and other value chains will benefit. With growing markets in Africa and Asia that do not have to comply with any certification in the US or in the EU this is a real risk. Economics supports such argument: a split demand results in a split price and split awareness, i.e. higher prices for those concerned and lower prices for those who do not care. Probably, the conflict situation wouldn't change much! Governance challenges for certification thus relate to feasibility and reliability, to the scope, and to the international dimension. Above all, one should conclude that certification efforts should be accompanied be profound reforms in governance.
A two track approach of pilots on the region and capacitor-based certification may yield results. Since capacitor manufacturers consume roughly half of the tantalum world-wide and have a strong position in the supply chain, more attention should be focused here. The regional certification scheme developed by the ICGLR (International Conference of the Great Lakes Region) is a useful initiative in that regard. The mechanism, which had been formally adopted by the ICGLR heads of state, covers cassiterite, coltan, wolframite and gold and aims at achieving compatibility with other initiatives, such as ITSCi (Initiative of the Tin Smelting Capacitor Industry), GeSI (Global electronics Sustainability Initiative) and EICC (Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition). Its main elements are chain of custody tracking from mine to export at country level, 24 regional tracking of mineral flows through the creation of a database on their purchases, independent audits on all actors in the supply chain and a monitoring of the whole mineral chain by a Mineral Chain Auditor (Blore and Smillie, 2011) . Compliance with certification schemes and data disclosure in their business reports is a key; third party audits, as suggested by OECD (2010), will improve reliability. Public offerings at regional stock exchanges may be options for the future. In particular it would help in the establishment of an international comprehensive monitoring mechanism and any enforcement.
These certification initiatives are taking advantage of the Kimberley Process for the certification of diamonds. Important lessons cover the purpose, administrative and operational aspects (Blore and Smillie, 2011) . 25 Following Haufler (2010) the elements of establishing inclusive and relatively strong institutions can be seen as key elements for success as well as market leverage in industrialized countries. The conclusion indeed is that administrative capacity building in the region with independent auditing will be a key to establish reliable evidence and to fight corruption. However, coltan differs from diamonds because 1. The number of actors involved upstream and their ability to mix illegitimate sources with legal ones during the first stages of the supply chain are huge; centralizing traders and monitoring 100% of their operations should be useful;
2.
The security situation in the region remains fragile;
3.
The production chain downstream is much more complex and entirely globalized, with Chinese companies being in the largest position;
4.
Tantalum is not an end-product in itself, many companies are unaware yet whether it is a component in one of their products, and consumers have difficulties to realize it either.
24 This aspect includes the emission of a regional certificate to ensure that mineral don't originate from conflict areas or are not illegally transferred among countries. 25 Concerning the purpose, the system needs a flexible approach and objectives should also aim at incorporating longer-term goals of governance, development and ethical practices. As for the administrative aspects, the system should cover the whole supply chain, ensure transparency and inclusive decision-making, and include a strong administrative structure to manage it. Finally, operational aspects include ensuring that production sites are free from militia/armed forces, databases on production-exports of minerals, independent third party monitoring and follow up of problems, credible sanctions for defectors (Blore and Smillie, 2010) .
Thus a better coordination among international approaches to promote legal mineral trade is at stake. This proves that voluntary efforts should be supported by international law to promote transparency, certification and accountability against corruption and in favour of sustainability. Following a suggestion made by Collier and Venables (2010: 15) , the anti-bribery legislation that the OECD now requires of its membership could be a requirement of WTO membership -a compliance issue for China and elsewhere. In the long run, an international agreement on sustainable resource management might also be an option (Bleischwitz 2009 ).
A two track approach of pilots on the region and capacitor-based certification as outlined above should also be accompanied by better governance at both the national and regional level. As claim the general conditions and social sector reforms in Eastern DRC are urgent preconditions for any progress.
As regards to prices and taxation, most researchers share the impression that the current systems neither capture negative externalities nor do they promote regional sustainable development. A general assessment and review of the DRC tax system with emphasis on simplification, transparency and accountability as well as raw material taxation at the extraction point would not only generate revenues but also give financing opportunities and incentives for value adding activities in the region . However tax competition with neighbouring countries (e.g. Rwanda) should be minimized via agreements -the EU offers a lot of practical guidance on how coordination can work. Such taxation also helps to establishing an appropriate legal order and could give more social security to mining workers and along the regional supply chain.
Ensuring that the profit from the mining sector trickles down to the local population with value creating activities may benefit from the establishment of an independent and accountable resource management fund. A regional resource fund where money of different donors and actors involved (public and private) can be pooled, could help ensuring better coordination among different actions, better allocation of investments and better division of the tasks. In addition, an improved and effective mining law that could be implemented with international support until the actual resource conflict is solved should be considered.
28 UNCTAD (2008 UNCTAD ( , 2010 suggests linking revenues of rising commodity prices strategically to developing goals such as infrastructure, education, health care or economic diversification, using even bilateral trade agreements in this context, e.g. by exporting raw materials for the construction of infrastructure. This could mean that the DRC extends the existing formal trade with China and other countries using their interest in coltan and other raw materials in order to finance governmental presence and (re-) build public infrastructure and improve processing capacities in its eastern parts. Further analysis may also shed light on the role of a development state and implications for any sustainable growth to contest the theory of a resource curse in this region (Collier / Goderis 2007; Gylfason 2009; World Bank 2008) .
Conclusions
Our analysis of international trade statistics reveals a significant amount of illicit coltan in the order of some 20 % on world markets (2009/10). At the heart of any solution should be the insight that markets need transparency and appropriate pricessafeguarded by proper institutions -to function properly. Illicit trade, intransparency and corruption are to be seen as major risks for the local population and for business. Market failures are likely to have substantial costs, in particular for a region like eastern DRC, but also for the market itself.
However a common interest for comprehensive solutions exists and stems from the critical need for such metals both in high-tech industries as well as in most countries. Australian mining company Talison is ready to re-enter the market as soon as current uncertainties will be reduced. Thus our estimation that current efforts to establish certification may have the unwanted side-effect of negative impacts in the eastern DRC should also lead to support for better governance in the region and in markets for minerals. Chinese companies, and in particular state-owned enterprises, should accept their responsibility to perform supply chain due diligence. Efforts to promote Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI) with its focal point China may help to level the playing field.
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Further analysis will also have to develop governance mechanisms to turn illicit trade in minerals into opportunities for sustainable development. This will not only require harmonized data and monitoring, but also capacity building initiatives and enforcement systems for the main stakeholders as well as better institutions such as resource taxation systems. As expressed above, new international legal and economic mechanisms should be established. In that regard, the current barriers and deficits might be removed by international incentives for re-use and recycling: material stewardship is an encouraging concept where capacitor producers currently are key business actors. They should be part of a future international covenant for the recycling of critical metals that involves in particular electronics industry (Wilts / Bleischwitz 2011) . Aim in this context is to increase industrial recycling, to collect more consumer goods and to establish recycling facilities internationally. Such covenant is well in line with high prices for primary resources as well as with fair trade. This is, of course, an agenda that goes beyond the scope of our case study. Having said this however the authors also wish to express the view that bans are a less desirable option because they would result in further economic hardship for the Congolese people. Putting the raw material conflict issue in the framework of sustainable resource management and international governance for trade in natural resources probably is a better way forward. 
